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Corporal Punishment in Schools: An Infringement
on Constitutional Freedoms
Thomas J. Baechle'
A CHILD IN SCHOOL IS PADDLED SEVERELY by his teacher for misbe-
havior, and as a result he has bruises for several days. While the
infliction of bruises or the severity of the punishment may not have
been intended by the teacher, in an action by the state against the
teacher the court holds that "mere" excessive or immoderate punish-
ment will not render the teacher criminally liable.' It must be shown
that the teacher acted out of malice and that there was a lasting or
permanent injury, or the threat of one, resulting from the punishment.
The use of the word "mere" in describing excessive or immoderate
punishment of a child is certainly unfortunate, for it serves to emphasize
the fact that there has been lacking for a long time any legal recognition
of the rights of a school child in regard to punishment of this sort. For
a court to refer to excessive punishment of a child as "mere" demon-
strates that it is time to take a much-needed look at the basic rights of
the child. This aspect of the problem has too long been neglected.
Court decisions seem to begin with an assumption of the correctness
of the teacher's actions. 2 Presumptions have been made in the wrong di-
rection, for it is now an often-repeated rule that individual liberties can-
not be abridged unless there is a demanding reason for the abridg-
ment.
3
It has also been held that unless a teacher is aware of a physical
handicap of the child, there will be no liability for an injury resulting
from such a handicap.4
The doctrine of in loco parentis and the right of the teacher to in-
flict corporal punishment has a long history of acceptance. The doctrine
itself has survived for centuries with no serious challenges to its va-
lidity or acceptability. The doctrine states that a teacher stands in the
place of the parent and has the right to discipline his students, including
the right to inflict corporal punishment for reasonable cause and in a
reasonable manner. 5 The basis of the doctrine is an assumption of the
delegation of parental authority and an assumption of the correctness
of the teacher's actions. A direct result of this doctrine is the passage
of statutes in several states granting the teacher the right to a reason-
* B.M.E., General Motors Institute; Fourth-year student at Cleveland State Univer-
sity College of Law.
1 State v. Lutz, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 402, 113 N.E.2d 757 (C.P. Stark County Ct. 1953).
2 Id.
3 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4 Quinn v. Nolan, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 585 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1879).
5 State v. Lutz, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 402, 113 N.E.2d 757 (C.P. Stark County 1953); Suits
v. Glover, 8 Div. 711, 71 So. 2d 49 (Alabama Sup. Ct. 1954); also see Annot., 43
A.L.R. 2d 473 (1955).
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able use of corporal punishment.6 The effect of statutes of this nature
is the infringement of two very basic fundamental rights: the right of a
parent to bring up his child as he sees fit, and the right of a child to
be free from invasions of the dignity and integrity of his person.
Parental Rights
Upbringing of Children
The duty of a parent to direct the upbringing of his child is of a
very serious nature.' The development of a human being carries with it
the obligation to properly prepare the child to live in the world. It is
a duty which is extremely personal in nature and over which the parent
should have complete control. Since this is such an important and
serious function in the development of the child's life, it should be con-
sidered a fundamental right of the parents.
The Supreme Court has held that parents have the right to direct
the upbringing and education of their children.8 "The child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations." 9 In carrying out this "high duty," par-
ents should have the right to control the use of corporal punishment in
disciplining the child. In Meyer v. Nebraska,0 the Court again said that
parents have a natural duty to properly educate their children, and that
the manner in which this education was to be accomplished was a liberty
protected by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. Equally as important is the disciplining of the child which is pro-
viding for the child's education in moral and behavior patterns.
The upbringing of children is the very basis of family life, and
family life is to be accorded the highest possible respect and protec-
tion.' Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe v. Ullman1 said that "the in-
tegrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been found to
draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted
Constitutional right."
Privacy of Family Life
In 1965, the Supreme Court upheld the dignity and respect of family
life by striking down Connecticut's birth-control laws.' 3 In the court's
6 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 3319.41:
"A person employed or engaged as a teacher, principal, or administrator in a
school, whether public or private, may inflict or cause to be inflicted, reasonable
corporal punishment upon a pupil attending such school whenever such punishment
is reasonably necessary in order to preserve discipline while such pupil is subject
to school authority."
See also Asiz. REV. STAT., § 13-246; Mim. STAT., ANNOT., § 609.06; REV. CODE OF
MONT., § 75-6109; TEx. PENAL CODE, art. 1142.
7 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E.
243 (1903).
8 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
9 Id. at 535.
10 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
11 People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
12 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
13 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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opinion Justice Douglas found the statute unconstitutional because it
operated against the relation of husband and wife, a relation which lies
"within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees." 14 This relation, he said, was included in the
penumbra which surrounds the first amendment- and which is formed
by "emanations from those guarantees." The right of marital privacy is
older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an as-
sociation that promotes a way of life, not causes . . . Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior de-
cisions.' 6
A considerable portion of this association has the purpose of raising and
developing children. This task, the most important and sacred of the
marriage relation, should also be included in the "zone of privacy created
by . . . fundamental constitutional guarantees."
As pointed out by the Court, the very thought of the sanctity of
the marital bedroom being violated is repugnant. It is equally repulsive
that the private role of the parent as the guardian of his children be vio-
lated. Just as the freedom of speech and press includes the right to
distribute, to receive and to read, the freedom of privacy in the mar-
riage relationship must include the freedom to choose a method of dis-
ciplining the children resulting from that marriage. Freedom of the press
would mean little without the protection of the means of implement-
ing and maintaining that freedom. By the same argument, the freedom
of privacy and sanctity in the family relationship is diminished with-
out the protection of the means of maintaining that relationship.
While the education of the child is mandatory, the manner in
which the education is achieved is a choice that constitutionally remains
with the parent.17 So too, the disciplining of the child is mandatory,
but the manner in which the disciplining is accomplished must remain
with the parent. It is imperative that the parent have the freedom to
choose the method of upbringing to be applied to his child.
The Court has recognized that the sanctity of the marital relation-
ship, the relation between husband and wife, falls within the zone of
privacy which is created by constitutional guarantees of fundamental
rights.18 To make a distinction between the marital relationship and
the family relationship would be to ignore the very purpose of the
marital relationship. A contention that the physical relation between
husband and wife lies within the area of respect and privacy protected
by the Constitution, demands that the social, emotional and intellectual
relation between parents and children be accorded the same respect and
14 Id. at 485.
15 Id. at 484.
16 Id. at 486.
17 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
18 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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privacy, because this second relation stems directly from the first rela-
tion.
The right to privacy in the sacred relation of parent-child must be
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
fourteenth amendment protects not only those liberties included in the
Bill of Rights but also protects those rights which are fundamental, but
not specifically mentioned. This theory has been advanced by the Court
on several occasions. 1
9
Those rights protected by the fourteenth amendment are not ex-
plicitly and definitely stated anywhere. They are not of such a nature
as to be fixed and unchanging; as human knowledge and experience in-
creases these rights must expand also.20 The advances of society and
science must be reflected in similar advances in the rights of individuals.
Decisions of the Supreme Court have reflected this trend of thought. 21
As needs arise, the Constitution must be flexible enough to afford
protection for violations of personal freedoms.
Included in the protection of the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments are rights that are fundamental to the in-
dividual.2 2 Under the due process clause, the Supreme Court has af-
forded protection against governmental interference of rights not in-
cluded in the specific listing of the first eight amendments. The Court
has invalidated a statute under which public employees were subject
to arbitrary dismissal on the basis of association membership; 2n has
struck down a regulation which arbitrarily restricted admission to the
bar,21 and has forbidden racial segregation in schools. 2 5 It has held
that, included in the liberty which cannot be taken from an individual
without due process of law, are the right to travel, 2 the right to pri-
vacy in association, 2' and the right to distribute information. 28 The
Court, in these decisions, has demonstrated that there are many per-
sonal freedoms that are not specifically mentioned in the Constitution
and that these freedoms will be accorded Constitutional protection. It
is necessary that this protection now be extended to embrace the fun-
damental right of a parent to discipline his child. It is time to limit the
doctrine of in loco parentis, which gives the teacher permission to exer-
19 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
20 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
21 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1945); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22 Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164, 173 (1906); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373 (1927).
23 Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
24 Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
25 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
26 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964).
27 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
28 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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cise a parental right. It is now necessary to alter the presumption that a
parent has delegated a fundamental right to another.
Support for this personal freedom to be included in the scope of the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause is gained from the ninth
amendment, which expressly states that the rights listed in the first eight
amendments are not intended to be exhaustive, but that other rights are
retained by the people. One of these retained rights is the right of
parental discipline. Although not mentioned in the Constitution, this is
a right similar to the right of privacy in marriage which the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut found to be protected from infringement by
the ninth amendment.2 9 In his opinion Justice Goldberg said that the
ninth amendment was not in any way being used to broaden the powers
of the Court, or as an independent source of fundamental rights.30 Rather,
the ninth amendment merely states that other rights should not be neg-
lected because they are not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.
The right of parental discipline is exactly the type of personal freedom
which is retained by the people.
Rights of Children
Dignity of the Human Body
The personal integrity and privacy of the human body is a prin-
ciple that is well-established in law. It has long been recognized that
any unpermitted offensive touching of the body is a battery.31 An as-
sault is the placing of another in apprehension of an immediate offensive
touching of the body.32 Any exception to these principles must certainly
be well-founded. The natural right to privacy of one's body from in-
vasions by others, including representatives of the state, "that are not
indisputably necessary for the safety of the community," is a right
which must be respected and accorded protection against infringement
by those who hold the opinion that man should serve the goals of the
state.33 An individual is entitled to an uninterrupted enjoyment of the
use of his limbs, body, and health,3 4 the right to "preserve his person
inviolate from attack by any other person," 95 and the inherent right of
bodily integrity.36
Need for Restrictions in Schools
Many restrictions have been made on the use of force on adults.
The use of physical punishment on seamen has been forbidden 37 and
its use has been greatly restricted in prisons. The integrity and dignity
of an individual's person has been seriously dealt with in cases concern-
29 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965).
30 Id. at 492.
31 W. PsOSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 30 (2d Ed. 1955).
32 Id. at 34.
33 C. ANTIEAU, RiaGHTs OF OuR FArHERS, at 93 (1968).
34 Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80 (N.J. Ch. Ct. 1940).
35 Gow v. Bingham, 107 N.Y. Supp. 1011 (Sup. Ct., Sp. Term 1907).
36 Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925).
37 18 U.S.C. § 2191.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN SCHOOLS 565
ing alleged criminals. It is an established principle of criminal procedure
that any use of force to produce a confession will result in its being in-
admissible in court. Yet the theory persists that the use of force as
punishment for children is permissible.
Corporal punishment in prisons is permitted in only two states and
in one of these states its use has been held to be unconstitutional. The
use of corporal punishment in prisons was ruled a violation of the
eighth amendment by a United States Court of Appeals in Jackson v.
Bishop.-s In deciding that the use of corporal punishment was cruel
and unusual, the Court relied on several findings: 39
1) No convincing evidence that any rule or regulation adopted
concerning the use of corporal punishment, would be success-
ful in preventing abuse, regardless of the sincerity with which
it was drawn up.
2) Such regulations often go unnoticed or are easily circum-
vented; difficulties are encountered in enforcing limitations of
power.
3) Use of corporal punishment is readily subject to abuse.
4) Corporal punishment develops hate toward those administering
it and toward the system which permits its use. It is degrading
and frustrates correctional goals.
5) Adjustment to society is made more difficult.
These reasons are even more applicable to the situation of the use
of corporal punishment in schools, since the child is in the development
stage of life. Situations frequently occur in which the power is abused,40
and the actual number of abuses is probably quite high. It is a type of
punishment which easily lends itself to abuse, and it creates an atmos-
phere of fear and distrust which is not conducive to learning.
Detriments of Corporal Punishment
1. Insufficient Supervision. Any virtues that might be found in a
system of immediate physical punishment are substantially outweighed
by the dangers inherent in a system where proper supervision is im-
possible or unlikely.4 1 In some instances, even though records are re-
quired, the actual extent of the usage is unknown, while in many other
instances, records are not even required. Thus, the frequency, severity
and the circumstances under which corporal punishment is inflicted can
not always be accurately determined. This is a situation which should
not be tolerated. The secrecy associated with the use of physical
punishment may itself be a strong indication that its value as an effective
method of discipline should be questioned. 42 It also lends support to the
argument that the teacher-student relationship suffers as a result. It
is probably impossible to make any objective study of the effectiveness
of corporal punishment without any substantial data in the form of
38 404 F.2d 571 (1968).
a9 Id. at 579.
40 J. KozOL, DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE (1967).
41 G. Scowt, Tm HISTOPY OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 192 (1959).
42 R. Gummere Jr., On Beating School Children, THE NATION, Dec. 6, 1965 at 442.
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accurate records. It is also impossible to determine whether any abuse
of the privilege is occurring. The fact that abuse is and can be a
serious problem is vividly described in a book by a former public school
teacher.43 From first-hand observations, it is illustrated how motives
other than child guidance and control can, sometimes unknowingly,
cause the use of physical punishment. Without any accurate records,
it cannot be determined which students receive the punishment and
how often. The answers to questions of this type would be extremely
useful in determining the causes of student behavior.
Is disorder caused more by what we teach pupils, the pupils we
teach it to, or the society which requires them to learn it? Does
the trouble come from our saber-toothed curriculum, our classroom
Ichabod Cranes, our restless youth, or our distraught grown-
ups? 44
Who can answer these questions? More important, who is attempting to
answer them? The most serious result of this secrecy is that funda-
mental personal rights are being violated unnoticed. Again, such a sit-
uation is intolerable. A continued use of corporal punishment is not an
answer. "Corporal punishment is a privilege that can easily be over-
done by parents and teachers. The child is the greatest immediate
loser. Adults and society are the indirect losers, suffering the effects of
the child's resentment." 45
2. Possibility of Physical Harm. The possibility of physical harm to
the child, though unintended, is itself a substantial reason for not using
corporal punishment. In areas where strict regulations concerning its
use are not adhered to, the severe physical mismatch of teacher and
student and the mental attitude of the teacher become important factors
in the administering of the punishment. In a study made concerning
the use of corporal punishment in the schools, 40 many of the arguments
advanced in its favor related to the aid and convenience of the teacher.
It has been said that "[F] requently we can improve the quality of dis-
cipline by improving the quality of teachers-not by strengthening their
whip-hand." 47
3. Customary Practice. Corporal punishment exists, in large part, as
a result of its customary use throughout the ages. This is, indeed, a
poor reason for its continued use.
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.48
Corporal punishment can become merely a crutch, used because other
methods of discipline are more challenging or inconvenient.
43 DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE, supra note 38.
44 On Beating Children, supra note 40.
45 E. PHILnLPS, D. WIENER, N. HARING, DISCIPLINE, ACHIEVEMENT AND MENTAL HEALTH 13
(1960).
46 K. JAMES, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1963).
47 Rosenberg, Should Teachers Wield the Rod?, PARENTS MAGAZINE, Feb., 1964, at 106.
48 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1921).
Sept. 197120 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3)
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4. Improper Teacher-Child Relationship. The education and de-
velopment of children is a process that must be undertaken with ex-
treme care. Development of a child's character and attitudes involves
problems that are often extremely difficult. Thus, a teacher is operating
in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. 49 He is shaping the attitude of
young minds toward the society in which they live. This thought was
affirmed in Sweezy v. New Hampshire"0 when the Supreme Court said
[n] o one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is
played by those who guide and train our youth ... Scholarship
cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers
and students must always remain free to .. . gain new maturity
and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
die.5 1
Again in Boilan v. Board of Educatio 5 2 the Court stated that
[I]t has always been the recognized duty of the teacher to conduct
himself in such a way as to command the respect and good will of
the community ...Educators have always regarded the example
set by the teacher as of great importance . . .53
The use of corporal punishment destroys the quality of an effective
teacher-child relationship by denying the worth and value of the in-
dividual and creating feelings of humiliation. By depending on the force,
the teacher loses influence in guiding children toward an intelligent
approach to their problems.
54
It is an interesting observation that there are lobbies in this
country for nearly every category imaginable. But someone must speak
for the children since they have no voting power of their own.
Trends in Juvenile Court
Recent trends in juvenile court proceedings have emphasized the
rights of children. That the child is an individual to be treated with
respect and is protected by the provisions of the fourteenth amendment
was stated by the court in Application of Gault.55 This thought was also
expressed in Pee v. U. S., a decision in which the court said that a
hearing in Juvenile Court must measure up to the essentials of due
process and fair treatment. In Kent v. United States57 the Court said
that the Juvenile Court of Washington, D. C. was engaged in "de-
termining the needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating
criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guidance
49 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
50 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
51 Id. at 250.
52 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
53 Id. at 407.
54 J. HowARD, CHMDREN IN TROUBLE 239 (1970); H. DOUGLAss, MODERN ADMINISTRATION
OF SECONDARY ScHooLs 332 (1963).
55 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
56 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
5T 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix crimi-
nal responsibility, guilt and punishment." 58
Such an objective emphasizes the strong desire of the judicial
system to focus on methods of guidance rather than punishment for
juveniles. This objective is equally necessary and important in edu-
cational institutions. The goal to be strived for is the creating and
fostering of an atmosphere that is most conducive to learning.59
Constitutional Right to Learn
The Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut'0 affirmed many of
its earlier holdings interpreting the rights protected by the first amend-
ment freedom of speech and press clause. In these holdings the Court
ruled that the state may not reduce the area of available knowledge,0 '
that the first amendment freedom of speech and press includes freedom
of inquiry, 2 freedom of thought, freedom to teach, 3 and freedom of the
"entire university community." 04 In Barenblatt v. U. S. the Court
said that "[w]hen academic teaching-freedom and its corollary learning-
freedom, so essential to the well-being of the Nation, are claimed, this
Court will always be on the alert against intrusion . . . into this con-
stitutionally protected domain." 60
From these decisions it is clear that the right to be free to inquire
and learn is very firmly established in constitutional law. The court, in
affirming these decisions, stated that "without these peripheral rights
the specific rights would be less secure." 67
If the freedom of association is considered a fundamental right, of
what significance is the freedom if the very essence of its existence is not
protected. By the same token, if the freedom of inquiry and learning
is considered a fundamental right, of what significance is the freedom
if the very means of exercising it is not protected.
State Interest
Necessity of Law
Whenever a state passes legislation which attempts to deny a funda-
mental personal right, it must be clearly and definitely shown that the
need for the legislation serves some "subordinating interest which is
compelling." 1s The protection of personal rights is so important that
only in situations where the state interest is overwhelming can it be
58 Id. at 554.
59 R. AmSTERDAM, CONSTRUCTIVE CLASSROOM DISCIPLINE AND PRACTICE 82 (1957); J.
HOWARD, CHILDREN IN TROUBLE 239 (1970).
60 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
61 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
62 Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1962).
63 Id.
64 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-250 (1957); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959).
G5 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
66 Id. at 112.
67 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
6s Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
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permitted to infringe on them. As the Supreme Court said in Griswold,
it is not sufficient that the state has rational considerations that sup-
port the legislation. 9 The statute cannot be so broad that it unneces-
sarily invades "the area of protected freedoms," 70 a principle set out in
several previous cases.7 ' Justice Goldberg said that where "fundamental
personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the state
simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relation-
ship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose." 72 It must be shown
that the law is "necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the
accomplishment of a permissible state policy." 73 Many times the Court
has stated that there is a "realm of family life" which the state cannot
enter without substantial justification.74
It then must be determined whether it is necessary to abridge both
the right of a parent to bring up his child and the personal dignity and
integrity of the child. This is the result of statutes which grant per-
mission to use corporal punishment.
Legitimate Purpose
It can be assumed that the state's interest in the matter is for the
protection of the general welfare and to sustain discipline and control
in the state's schools. This is definitely a legitimate state interest. It
is not denied that the state, in exercising its police power, can maintain
control in its schools; however, the manner in which the state attempts
to achieve this goal can most certainly be challenged, and when two
fundamental personal liberties are abridged by one statute, then the
statute must be viewed very critically and harshly. It must be viewed
with serious thought given as to the alternate methods of achieving the
goal, methods which would not infringe on basic personal rights. It is
not a question of the Supreme Court operating as a "super-legislature to
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic
problems, business affairs, or social conditions." 75 The present law de-
prives individuals of fundamental rights and for that reason it must be
carefully scrutinized.
Alternative Methods
It must be determined then, whether an alternative method is avail-
able. If there is a "reasonable and adequate" alternative available, then
the statute must be stricken down.76 This alternative can be found by
looking to experts in the area of behavior. Great advances have been
60 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965).
70 NAACP v. Alabama, 360 U.S. 240 (1959).
71 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 360 U.S. 240
(1959); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939).
72 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965).
73 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
74 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961) (dissenting opinion of J. Harlan).
75 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
76 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
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made in observing, interpreting and treating behavior patterns in peo-
ple, especially children, by psychologists and psychiatrists working in
this field. Present theories in this area reject the idea that physical
punishment is the best method of developing the child's character or
that it is the best method of controlling child behavior.7 7 In fact, there
is much authority which states that physical punishment can actually
result in harm being done by creating feelings of resentment and an
atmosphere that is not conducive to education.7S
Another major detriment to the use of corporal punishment is the
effect it has on the child. In many cases the only result is the develop-
ment of an attitude of resentment and fear. "The danger, in all cases,
is that the infliction of corporal punishment will create sullenness, hy-
pocrisy and cunning where these did not previously exist, or that it will
develop or extend these undesirable characteristics in all instances
where they were already in existence." 79 The development of a mutual
respect between student and teacher is recognized as an important
factor in fostering an effective classroom atmosphere. It is difficult to
achieve this mutual respect with the use of physical punishment be-
cause attitudes of resentment or submission are created within the child
in living with authority.
Another means of determining if an alternate method is available is
to compare legislation on the subject. New Jersey schools have been
operating under a prohibition of corporal punishment since 1867 with
no apparent ill effects.80 The philosophy behind this statute is reflected
in decisions made by the Commissioner of Education in situations where
such punishment was inflicted.8 ' These decisions state that an in-
dividual has a right to be free from bodily harm or any infringement
on the physical integrity of his person as a result of physical pain in-
flicted by another.
Many individual school boardsS2 forbid corporal punishment in the
interest of developing strong teacher-student relationships,8 3 and several
foreign countries s4 have abolished this "uncivilized custom." 85
77 R. AMSTERDAM, CONSTRUCTIVE CLASSROOM DISCIPLINE AND PRACTICE 82 (1957); N.
CUrTs, & N. MOSELEY, TEACHING THE DISORDERLY PUPIL 34 (1957); J. HowARn, CHILDREN
IN TROUB3LE 239 (1970); R. DRErKuRS, & L. GREY, LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES: A NEw AP-
PROACH To DISCIPLINE (1968); E. PHILLIPS, D. WEINER, & N. HAING, DISCIPLINE,
ACHIEVEMENT AND MENTAL HEALTH (1960); H. DOUGLASS, MODERN ADMINISTRATION OF
SECONDARY SCHOOLS.
78 N. CUTTS &. N. MOSELEY, PRACTICAL SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND MENTAL HEALTH (1960);
H. DOUGLASS, MODERN ADMINISTRATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1963).
79 G. ScoTT, THE HISTORY OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 190 (1959).
80 N.J. STAT. ANNOT. 18A: 6-1.
81 In the Matter of the Tenure Hearing of Frederick L. Ostergren, School District
of Franklin Township, Somerset County, decided by New Jersey Commissioner of
Education, Oct. 25, 1966; In the Matter of the Tenure Hearing of Pauline Nickerson,
Peapack-Gladstone, Somerset County, decided by the Commissioner of Education,
Sept. 2, 1965.
82 Philadelphia, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Baltimore.
83 Discipline for Constructive Citizenship, ADMINISTRATIVE BULLETIN No. 22, School
District of Philadelphia (1955).
84 Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden; Vaigo, Cane Now Ended Throughout Scan-
dinavia, London Times Education Supplement 671, Oct. 4, 1968.
85 Vaigo, Cane Now Ended Throughout Scandinavia, supra note 84.
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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These examples indicate that an alternative does exist. Schools can
operate effectively without having to resort to physical punishment.
School control can be maintained without the need for the state to
abridge the personal liberties of parents and children.
It would seem that the state would want to achieve its goal with
the most advanced methods. Child development is such an important
function that it is imperative that primitive and outdated methods be
abolished.
Conclusion
At a time when the schools and the entire educational system have
been subjected to criticism from many directions, it appears that an ap-
proach is needed which will direct itself towards the best interests of
the child. Since there are substantial psychological reasons as well as
constitutional reasons for the prohibition of corporal punishment, and
since certain jurisdictions are presently operating under such a prohibi-
tion, the interests of the child would best be served by finally laying to
rest the authority to use such punishment.
We have seen a substantial increase in the use of violence in recent
years and an increasing awareness of its detrimental effect, whether it
occurs as an act of criminal assault, a means of protest or an act of war.
Perhaps a different approach in the early stages of education can result
in the desired solution to this problem.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/14
